Andrey Areshev, political scientist

On the night of February 22, 2022, one of the sharpest and most uncompromising responses to Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as independent states was made by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke in a similar vein, calling Moscow’s forced decision “unacceptable” and calling on “the parties to be guided by common sense and respect international law.” Note that the leaders of the country have been talking about the life-giving power of “international law” for years and in some places for decades, occupying the territory of several neighboring states and not hiding their claims to Crimea.

It is no secret that the increased attention of the Turkish media, politicians and experts of a radical nationalist persuasion (pro-government or opposition – it is not so important) not only to the post-Soviet space, but also to a number of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, considered as having no independence “autonomous Turkic republics.” During the November summit of the “Turkic Council”, re-established as the “Organization of Turkic States” in Istanbul, Erdogan stated that “Turkic countries have remained the center of culture and civilization for thousands of years”, and expressed confidence that the 21st century will be “the century of Turkic states”.

It is no secret that in addition to Turkey itself, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan played a special role in the formation of the “Turkic Council”, the first president of which, Nursultan Nazarbayeva, was awarded the informal title “Honorary aksakl of the Turkic world.” However, the dramatic January events in Kazakhstan led to a radical change in the political scenery, seriously alarming the Pan-Turkists from the camp of Erdogan’s allies from the Nationalist Action Party and not only them.

The assertion that the riots in Almaty and other major centers, which forced President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev to seek help from the CSTO, came as a surprise to Ankara, if true, then only in part. The first statement of the Turkish Foreign Ministry followed at the peak of the pogroms in Almaty on January 5, and after a short time, local security forces managed to detain the notorious Arman Dzhumageldiev (“Wild Arman”), who arrived in Kazakhstan in advance, who lived in Turkey for a long time and acquired serious connections there. Using a wide range of tools of “soft” and “hard” power, Turkish ideologists seek to “win hearts and minds” in the republics of the former Soviet Central Asia. According to the author of the Daily Sabah, “…becoming a regional player, Turkey should take the lead in establishing strong and sustainable cooperation between the Turkic countries. As major European powers continue to withdraw from the international arena, Turkey must fill the void by addressing regional issues not only in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, but also in the Caucasus and Central Asia”.

Despite advanced political-diplomatic and military-technical ties with Ankara (up to assumptions about the creation of a “Turkic” analogue of NATO), the appeal of the republic’s authorities for help to the CSTO provoked a violent reaction from numerous adherents of the “Turkic world”. On January 6, expressing dissatisfaction with the insufficiently active, in his opinion, reaction to the events in the “fraternal” country, the Turkish leader instructed to strengthen the interaction of law enforcement agencies at the level of both the Organization of Turkic States and bilateral contacts.

Almost immediately, mainstream Turkish media commentators such as TRT World columnist Yusuf Erim began to speculate that “the only acceptable peacekeeping force to promote stability in Kazakhstan could be the Organization of Turkic States peacekeeping force, which should only be deployed at the request of a member state “Kazakhstan”.

The former chief of staff of the Turkish Navy, the author of the “Blue Homeland” concept, Cihat Yayci, talked about the need to create some kind of “Turan army”. A similar opinion is shared by another retired general, former military attache in Baku, Yudzhel Karauz: they say that events in Kazakhstan “may begin in other fraternal republics,” and therefore there is no time to waste, because you can suffer “irreparable damage.”

The nationalist publication Türkiye goes even further, proposing to “immediately create a joint Turkic force”, starting to prepare the legal grounds for this. All possible options are being considered, and as events unfold, any measures deemed necessary can be taken, Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar assured: upon receipt of any request or relevant instructions in Turkey, “we are ready to provide all kinds of assistance and support to our Kazakh brothers”. In the presence of loosened and ideologically fertilized soil, it is possible that such requests may follow the next round of Kazakh protests.

According to the doctor of historical sciences Alexander Kobrinsky, “already today, in the south of Kazakhstan, the ideas of Turan enjoy serious support among the population. The weakening of Kazakhstan is a direct strengthening of the positions of pan-Turkism… chaos in Kazakhstan is objectively not only beneficial, but necessary for Turkey. A strong and stable Kazakhstan is a serious stone on this path. Given the close cooperation between Ankara and London, the picture is taking on a finished look”.

The hypothetical participation of Russian military personnel in dispersing the protests would provoke an increase in nationalist sentiment, threatening to draw “the Russian minority in the north of the country into violent clashes,” writes one of the influential Turkish political scientists Burhanettin Duran. The conservative publication Yeni Akit, under the heading “Only Turkey is interested in a strong Kazakhstan,” calls on Ak-Saray to intervene in the settlement of the escalation in Kazakhstan in a similar way to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Syria and Libya. Turkey’s ally in the Organization of Turkic States, freed “from the 30-year Soviet yoke” and managed to return to its cultural roots, can now be brought under the “new yoke” – these and other scandalous statements by one of Erdogan’s “talking heads” required a special diplomatic response from Moscow.

Speaking on January 11 at the online conference of UTC foreign ministers, Mevlut Cavusoglu expressed satisfaction with the stabilization of the situation in Kazakhstan, without mentioning how this was achieved. “Kazakhstan has state traditions, experience and the ability to overcome the current crisis,” said the head of Turkish diplomacy. The joint statement published after the meeting contains a reference to the document “The Vision of the Turkic World 2040” as a “guideline for coordination, cooperation and mutual assistance in solving domestic and international problems.” According to the results of the recent summit in Istanbul, apparently, the corresponding proposals did not find support, not least due to the lack of confidence that the hypothetical “Turanian army”, if it had appeared in Kazakhstan or elsewhere, would have left the same way quickly, as did, completing the mission to stabilize the situation in the country, the CSTO peacekeeping forces.

There is no doubt that expansionist sentiments in Turkey are of a stable nature, regardless of the assessment of the personality of the incumbent president, and sooner rather than later they will be “materialized” into concrete decisions. So far, claims for pan-Turkic leadership do not fit well with reality, but long-term observations of Turkey’s foreign policy inspire confidence that attempts to change this reality will follow in the near future – in the form, for example, of the formation of pan-Turkic paramilitary units. The considerable experience of the Turks in the use of “private military campaigns”, terrorists and mercenaries suggests a serious attention to this problem, both within the framework of bilateral contacts, and at the level of international organizations, such as the SCO.

A source