X

Azerbaijan: dizzy with “success”

Date of publication: 29 July 2025

Baku is starting a complex regional game  without considering the possible consequences

Russia and Iran held CASAREX 2025 naval exercises in the Caspian Sea. The maneuvers were aimed at strengthening cooperation between the two navies and practicing joint search and rescue operations. In the past, such exercises may have gone unnoticed, but now, in light of the changes in the Caspian region, they are in the spotlight.

In Baku many believe that Moscow and Tehran sought to use these naval maneuvers to demonstrate their power and influence in the region. Some experts suggest that in response, they should consider hosting Turkish and NATO military bases on their territory. However, they ignore the fact that similar exercises were held last year (CASAREX 2024) with the participation of all five Caspian countries.

However, this time Azerbaijan rushed to organize joint military maneuvers with Kazakhstan in the same waters just a month earlier, without inviting Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan. After that air-tactical exercises with Kazakhstan were held in Azerbaijan itself. The desire of the Azerbaijani leadership not to participate in CASAREX 2025 but to conduct parallel exercises with only one of the Caspian states, calls into question the long-standing principles of collective security in the Caspian.

The Caspian Sea, once called the “sea of friendship,” is becoming a source of tension in world politics. This explains Tehran’s dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan’s policies. Baku used to claim that the Caspian region was outside NATO’s sphere of influence. Now, by cooperating with the United States and Israel, Azerbaijan is provoking foreign interference.

Iranian citizens increasingly view their neighbor as a potential threat, possibly colluding with Israel. Residents of Iranian cities bordering Azerbaijan reported cases of drones entering the country’s airspace from Azerbaijani territory during the 12-day war. Some Western media outlets also claimed that Baku allowed Israel to launch drones from its territory. Although the Iranian government has not officially acknowledged these claims, President Pezeshkian called on Aliyev to investigate the matter. Iran has repeatedly made claims against Azerbaijan, claiming that it supports Israel and allows it to deploy military facilities on its territory. Tehran may present good reasons for such claims.

Azerbaijan is the only Muslim country that supports Israel in its war against Hamas and Hezbollah. President Aliyev has made clear his solidarity with the Jewish state, while other Muslim countries have at least tried to stay out of it. At the height of the conflict, senior officials from both countries, including the defense ministers, held talks on expanding regional cooperation. Even as most Western airlines stopped flying to Israel, Azerbaijan’s state airline continued to fly. The flow of Israeli tourists to Azerbaijan increased by 50% relatively.

Since the early 2000s, Azerbaijan has become a major buyer of military products from Israel. In the 2010s, the share of Israeli supplies in total arms imports was almost 70%. Relations improved after the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, when Israeli weapons played a decisive role in Azerbaijan’s military success. A new agreement was concluded in September 2024, which has generated billions of dollars in revenue. These deals support jobs in Israel, promote the development of new military technologies, and contribute to joint Israeli-US projects that are key to Israel’s security.

Since the 1990s, Azerbaijan has played a key role in Israel’s energy security. Azerbaijani gas was vital to the country even before the normalization of relations with Arab states in 1994 and the discovery of large gas fields in Israel between 1999 and 2009. In the 1990s and 2000s, Azerbaijani energy supported the Israeli economy, remaining its only reliable partner in the Muslim world. Azerbaijan supplies more than 60% of the fuel used by Israelis, from gasoline for cars to jet fuel for the Air Force’s fighter jets. In the context of recent wars, when Israel especially needs a stable supply of fuel, Azerbaijani oil exports to the Jewish state increased by 55%.

Israel and Azerbaijan are key allies in the standoff with Iran. Notably, this cooperation began 30 years ago in the United States. In October 1995, during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in New York, President Heydar Aliyev noted that his country shared a border with Iran and asked for help with security issues. Since Ilham Aliyev became president of Azerbaijan in October 2003, the anti-Iranian basis of the alliance has remained virtually unchanged.

From Iran’s perspective, Baku’s rapprochement with Jerusalem increases Israel’s presence in the region, but Tehran does not have enough influence to force Azerbaijan to change the nature of its relations with Israel. However, relations between Azerbaijan and Israel are not the only factor complicating relations between Tehran and Baku. For example, Tehran is concerned about the idea of creating the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” – a land route that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through the territory of Armenia’s southern Syunik province.

The project, promoted by Baku, could sever Iran’s historic land ties with Armenia and give Azerbaijan and Turkey control over a key route in the region. Although the project has met with strong opposition from Iran, recent comments from the Trump administration have reignited concerns. The US has offered to take over the corridor project, framing it as support for ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iranian experts see the initiative as a geopolitical maneuver aimed at sidelining Iran. Indeed, external players are interfering in the process, ignoring the interests of regional countries.

Given the common border, developed economic ties and the risk of instability being transferred to its territory, Baku is not interested in a direct confrontation with Iran. In the long term, Azerbaijan will continue to balance between a strategic alliance with Israel, close support from Ankara, Washington’s influence and a conflictual neighborhood with Tehran. Russia is also unlikely to remain aloof from the events taking place in its southern periphery.

Nikolay Bobkin, political scientist, G.A. Arbatov Institute of the USA and Canada

 



A source

Comments

0

Read on the topic