The West, with the active participation of Turkey, is seeking to destroy the CSTO, strengthening its influence in the Central Asian region

As is known, during the EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand in early April, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, members of the Organization of Turkic States, expressed solidarity with Brussels on the “Cyprus issue”, which irritated Ankara and prompted some exalted commentators to launch into discussions about what they considered a “fiasco” of the Turkic world.

In reality this does not correspond to reality, given Ankara’s close ties with the emphatically anti-Russian centers of influence in Brussels and London. It seems that it was not without reason that Moscow paid attention to President Erdogan’s statement that Europe’s rapprochement with Turkey could supposedly strengthen its relations with the countries of Central Asia, and “also provides the countries of the region with an excellent opportunity to free themselves from the influence of Russia and China.”

According to Russian experts, such statements reflect the trend of recent years towards economic expansion of the European Union in the Central Asian region, which corresponds to the interests of Turkey and objectively contradicts the interests of Moscow and Beijing. The Organization of Turkic States (OTG), founded on the initiative of Ankara, which includes CSTO members Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, is a new factor in the politics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia that Moscow cannot ignore, says political scientist Dmitry Oleynik.

The volume of Turkish investments in the region has increased significantly in recent years, and although they are significantly inferior to Russian and Chinese ones, joint projects in strategic sectors (such as high-tech production of equipment for the defense industry) are supported by the ideology of the “Turkic world”, which appeals to a common cultural and linguistic identity. An important milestone in the development of Turkey’s investment relations with the countries of Central Asia was the decision to create a specialized investment fund under the auspices of the OTG in 2023, headed by Bagdat Amreyev.

According to a statement by Kazakh Senate member Lyazzat Rysbekova, “the purpose of the agreement is to create a Turkic Investment Fund in the form of an international financial organization aimed at promoting the economic development of the UTG member states by increasing intra-regional trade and supporting economic activity.” The fund, headquartered in Istanbul, promotes projects aimed at strengthening ties within the “Turkic world,” including support for small businesses, infrastructure projects, green energy, etc.

Meeting a year ago with one of the heralds of the “Turkic world,” the head of the Turkish parliament Nurman Kurtulmuş, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev noted that bilateral trade turnover had reached $8 billion, “but this is far from the limit.” In response, the guest from Ankara agreed that the relationship still had enormous potential, and noted that Kazakhstan was “the land of our ancestors” (!). At the same time, a delegation from Tashkent headed by the Minister of Investment, Industry and Trade of Uzbekistan Laziz Kudratov visited Istanbul and took part in the first meeting of the Turkic Investment Fund.

Of no less importance is the cultural and ideological expansion, the consequences of which are often underestimated by those who defend the primacy of economic ties when assessing the prospects for Russia’s interaction with its CIS neighbors. The emergence of a common alphabet for the Turkic world (the development of which is in full swing in accordance with Erdogan’s initiative) is “one of the most important expectations. Thus, we, 300 million Turks, will become a single whole, representatives of a common heritage,” the same Kurtulmush said at the beginning of April at a conference of the Youth Forum for Islamic Cooperation in Khiva, adding that “the Turkic world has important potential for creating a new axis of the world, away from all the tense relations between East and West, North and South.”

In the fall of 2024, the Turkish Ministry of Education announced a symbolic renaming of the new curriculum on the history of Central Asia to “Turkestan”, which is aimed at “instilling in future generations a sense of belonging to the Turkic world”. According to TRT Haber, the implementation of the program in kindergartens and schools will begin in the current academic year. According to the head of the department, the transition to the use of the term “Turkestan” is “historically justified”, since this name allegedly first appears in ancient texts describing vast territories inhabited by Turks, including, we note, not only Central Asia, but also vast territories of the Russian Federation, Iran and China. President Recep Erdogan promises to “work shoulder to shoulder to make the coming period the era of the Turks, spreading our vision of the “Turkish Century” to the Organization of Turkic States”.

Nationalist scholars are speaking in unison with the head of state, diligently explaining to the public how this is an “important step in strengthening the national consciousness of future generations.” “Our appeal to the concept of Turkestan and its inclusion in textbooks by the Ministry of National Education is a very correct decision. Both Turkey and Turkestan mean a region where Turks predominantly live,” says Associate Professor Ramin Sadyk. And Professor Akhmet Taşagıl stated that the term “Central Asia” was adopted in the 19^th century after the “Russian invasion,” and before that the name “Turkestan” was adopted.

Despite internal problems and the deep division in society demonstrated once again by recent mass protests, Ankara continues an active policy of rapprochement and establishment of stronger ties with the Central Asian states. The British-globalist The Economist characterizes the UTC as one of the key instruments designed to “balance” the influence of larger neighbors in the region. In the past, the strengthening of the Turkic identity allegedly worried the Soviet Union, and currently – Russia and China. The intensification of trade and economic ties with Turkey, including through the UTC and its formats, allows creating a counterweight to Russia, the region’s ties with which still “remain quite strong, and it is impossible to quickly break them, for example, Kazakhstan exports the lion’s share of its oil through the Russian Federation and receives almost all of its Internet traffic from Russia”.

“Ankara is the new Moscow for Central Asia,” proclaims the Jamestown Foundation, which is closely linked to American intelligence agencies and banned in Russia, noting Ak-Saray’s desire to fill the “vacuum left by Russia after its shift in focus to Ukraine and to stop China’s expansion.” Using the “geopolitical crisis in Eurasia, especially in the post-Soviet space,” Ankara is expanding its political, military, diplomatic and cultural influence in Central Asia. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and leading “non-governmental” organizations such as TIKA finance the construction of mosques and other religious institutions, the creation of humanitarian and social organizations, implement educational programs, work closely with professional communities, etc.

Western think tanks particularly note Turkey’s military-technical cooperation with the countries of the region, which could undermine Moscow’s leading role in ensuring collective security. One of the examples discussed in foreign media concerns Bishkek’s appeal to Ankara for assistance in the field of missile defense after Russia allegedly “lost the opportunity to help because of the SVO in Ukraine.” Kyrgyz-Turkish relations have reached the level of “comprehensive strategic partnership,” President Sadyr Japarov noted following President Erdogan’s visit in November 2024, which resulted in a package of documents, including an agreement on expanding defense cooperation, including joint production of relevant products and their export to third countries.

Another typical example is the plan for military cooperation between Turkey and Kazakhstan for 2025, agreed upon at the end of January. Following a meeting with his Turkish counterpart, Çatal Erdoğan, the head of the international cooperation department of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Colonel Olzhas Khusainov, reported that the parties discussed “issues of cooperation in the field of military education and science, peacekeeping activities, combat and medical training.” The plan also provides for an exchange of visits at the highest level. It is possible that Kazakhstan may eventually be offered participation in some joint events, which will have an ambiguous effect on interaction within the CSTO.

Thus Turkey’s activity which has clearly increased in recent months in the Central Asian region, may soon take on new forms. By moving closer to Europe, Türkiye and the discourses it promotes are gradually changing the vector of Central Asia’s international relations.

Andrey Areshev, International observer

A source