Nikolay Bobkin, political scientist, Institute of the USA and Canada. Academician G.A. Arbatova

The recent G20 summit in India was held without the participation of the leaders of Russia and China. Vladimir Putin sent Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Delhi in his place, and Xi Jinping sent Chinese Premier Li Qiang. The absence of the Russian president was expected, and the fact that Xi Jinping skipped the G20 summit for the first time and Beijing did not give any explanation for his non-participation became the subject of heated discussions.

The US, which is openly pushing India towards a conflict with China, has made great efforts to fan “disagreements” between New Delhi and Beijing on this issue. Other experts saw this as a demonstration by the Chinese leader of support for his Russian colleague and the strength of ties with Moscow. The Indian side chose not to dwell on speculation about the level of representation of the meeting participants. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar said the focus should be on countries’ positions on key issues.

One can agree with him that the absence of Xi Jinping did not have a noticeable impact on the outcome of the summit, since the declaration issued following its results was mainly agreed upon during the preparation of the forum. However, while New Delhi has repeatedly said that the summit is not a place of geopolitical competition, there are reasons to believe that Xi’s absence does signal a growing chill in relations between India and China. In the context of the complex relationship between the leaders of the two countries, the question arises: is a conflict between Delhi and Beijing possible and how strong is the alliance between India and China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.

On the eve of the summit, Delhi, through diplomatic channels, protested to Beijing over the published “standard map” of China in 2023, which outlines claims to Indian territory. A long-standing territorial dispute over the ownership of almost 60 thousand square meters. km of territory in the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, as well as in northern Kashmir, escalated in 2020 and remains unresolved to this day. This poses a serious political challenge for Narendra Modi, who has positioned himself as a strong leader who will not compromise on issues of territorial integrity.

One is not talking about armed confrontation. Delhi has limited options against a militarily and economically superior Beijing. The International Monetary Fund projects it will account for 35% of global growth in 2023, while India will account for 15%. Not surprisingly, fears of any military confrontation remain a critical factor in India’s strategy toward Beijing. On the other hand, the realization that India could fail in the event of war is pushing the Modi government to take new steps to expand the US-India defense partnership.

India recently joined an anti-China alliance called the Quad group of nations (QUAD) along with the US, Australia and Japan, which is committed to containing Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Joining QUAD has exacerbated India’s current problems with China. To reassure Beijing, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar has repeatedly stressed that the alliance is not an Asian NATO. In response, the Chinese list a long list of recent moves by New Delhi to deepen defense ties with America.

The US and India have established intelligence-sharing channels and regularly conduct military exercises to develop interoperability issues. Washington has supported India in all recent border crises with China and Pakistan. During Modi’s visit to Washington this year, India and the United States struck a major deal to make General Electric aircraft engines in India, including the provision of sophisticated technology that was never shared even with American allies, which could tie the two countries’ defense industries together for years to come.

India is resorting to other ways to compete with Chinese dominance in the region. In economic policy, the Modi government is encouraging domestic companies to look for alternatives to Chinese imports. But many experts believe it will take time, likely measured in decades rather than years, for India to significantly reduce Chinese imports. This also applies to financial dependence, as can be seen from India’s particularly close cooperation with the Chinese-controlled Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.

As for the Chinese “New Silk Road” project, it is also assessed as a factor in geopolitical competition between Delhi and Beijing. On the sidelines of the India summit, the United States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and the European Union agreed to create a transport and economic corridor connecting South Asia with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and European countries. The parties signed a corresponding memorandum of understanding, called the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). It has been suggested that this could be the main reason for the Chinese leader’s absence from the summit.

However, this is not the first major project the US has approved to reshape global connectivity in a way that benefits Washington and constrains China’s advances in the Middle East and South Asia. It is appropriate to recall that during the entire existence of the G20 in this format, not a single decision was made that was subsequently implemented. It is likely that this initiative will remain on paper.

However, Middle Eastern countries see their interests in IMEC. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for example, see this initiative not as an anti-China project, but rather as a step that will help them better position themselves economically and infrastructurally in changing global ties, a process that has worsened since the conflict in Ukraine.

The decision to join the corridor follows the recent invitation of these countries to join BRICS, another measure to build a multipolar order. Exclusive dependence on China in the Gulf monarchies has never been discussed, and a similar approach remains in relations with the United States.

In general, Delhi’s current policy towards Beijing can be characterized as a balancing act between China and the United States. With respect to key partners and in most issue areas, the Modi government’s position has taken on a distinctly nationalist tone, but remains essentially similar to the policies of previous administrations.