Vladimir Sazhin, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Senior Researcher, Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, professor

Extraordinary presidential elections were held in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) on June 28. These were the 14th presidential elections in the 45 years of Iran’s existence. Iranians were choosing their ninth president. Early elections were called in connection with the death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a plane crash on May 19.

To conduct elections in Iran, where the number of voters is almost 61.5 million people, about 60 thousand polling stations were formed within the country and abroad. Security in Iran at polling stations was ensured by almost 800 thousand security and police officers.

At 12 o’clock on June 29, a representative of the election headquarters announced the final results of the vote. A total of more than 24.5 million votes were cast in the elections. Voter turnout, accordingly, was about 40% – the lowest result in the entire history of Iran.

10.5 million voters (42.5%) voted for Masoud Pezeshkian, 9.5 million (38.6%) for Said Jalili, 3.4 million (13.78%) for Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. for Mostafa Pourmohammadi – 0.2 million (0.84%). It is noted that more than one million spoiled and invalid ballots were thrown in (4.3%).

The work of polling stations lasted from 8 a.m. to 12 midnight and was extended three times to attract as many voters as possible. At the same time, according to the commander of the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces, General Ahmad Reza Radan, the elections took place calmly, without a single incident. Complete order was maintained at the sites. True, there were excesses in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, but they were not directly related to the elections. There were attempts at cyber attacks, but this did not affect the progress and results of the voting, since Iran did not use electronic voting machines, but only paper ballots. That is, these incidents did not affect the elections in any way.

The results of the vote on June 28 show that none of the candidates received 50% + 1 vote, therefore, in accordance with Iranian laws, a second round of voting will take place, which will take place on Friday, July 5. On this day, two winners of the first round will compete – Masoud Pezeshkian and Said Jalili. They have one week to conduct the election campaign and televised debates. It is noteworthy that Iran has only had one second round of presidential elections in its history: in 2005, when hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defeated former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

What conclusions can be drawn from the results of the first round?

Firstly, in these elections, Iranians showed the lowest turnout in the entire history of Iran. In the last presidential election in June 2021, the turnout was 49%. Today, while discussing the election situation, Iranians on social networks are actively sharing a video of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s sermon in 2001, when he ridiculed Western countries for the low turnout in their elections. In his sermon, he said that the 40% turnout was a disgrace and pointed out that the citizens of these countries, including the United States, do not trust or have hope in their political system.

Secondly, Iranian society is split into diametrically opposed political strata. This is proven by the fact that it was the representatives of two polar ideological concepts (reformers and radical fundamentalists) who were supported by voters.

What awaits Iran on July 5?

The speaker of the Majlis, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who lost the election, called on his supporters to vote for Said Jalili. Hojat-ol-eslam Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who also did not get enough votes, spoke neutrally, only calling on the people to come vote on July 5. Ali Reza Zakani and Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, who left the presidential race even before the elections, gave their preference to the fundamentalists, or as they are also called in Iran, the principalists. That is, a united front of fundamentalists and conservatives will oppose the reformist Pezeshkian.

On July 5, there will be a duel not just between two politicians, each of whom proposed their own program of action (such programs were not presented by the candidates at all during the election campaign), but between representatives, as noted above, of two polar ideological concepts. Iranian voters will have to determine which of the proposed concepts – fundamentalist or reformist – the new president should propose to the supreme leader as the basis of his activities as president of the country.

It is clear that the president is not able to turn the strategic course of the Rakhbar 180 degrees, but he is able to give this course one or another shade, which, undoubtedly, can affect the foreign and domestic policy of Iran. There are examples of this in the history of the Islamic Republic: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989 – 1997), Mohammad Khatami (1997 – 2005), Hassan Rouhani (2013 – 2021). These presidents, realistically assessing the situation in which Iran found itself, pursued policies that sometimes diverged from the ideological postulates of the regime, but on the whole objectively contributed to its strengthening.

Will Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei today agree with the possibility of a reformer coming to presidential power, that is the question. Of course, Rakhbar and his team have powerful administrative resources that can influence the course and results of the vote. But no one doubts that, first of all, the results of the second round depend on the will of voters, who, of course, want to see their country prosperous.

But Iran has enough problems. Whoever becomes the ninth president of the Islamic Republic will face significant challenges from day one. Social discontent, which fueled repeated protests, the crisis state of the economy, and the decline in living standards of the population are the main internal problems. The war in the Middle East, Iran’s tense relations with Israel and the United States are at the top of the foreign policy agenda. And all these issues are, to one degree or another, related to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem.

How will President Said Jalili or President Masoud Pezeshkian solve these problems?

There is no doubt that President Jalili will continue both the domestic and foreign policies of Ebrahim Raisi, but only in a more radical manner, and in all areas of both foreign and domestic policy.

In domestic policy, President Pezeshkian will try to relieve tensions in the social sphere, softening the harsh guidelines of the morality police and establishing more or less normal relations with potentially rebellious youth. In economics, use some liberal solutions. In foreign policy, Mr. Pezeshkian will look for opportunities to implement a multi-vector policy in the interests of Iran. Moreover, his preferences will be both within the SCO and BRICS, where countries with different military-political orientations are united, and outside these alliances, meaning the normalization, first of all, of trade and economic relations with Western Europe and the mitigation of confrontation with the United States.

At the same time, M. Pezeshkian should not be considered a radical oppositionist to the regime. Yes, he denounced the Raisi administration as failing to solve Iran’s problems, but he never crossed the line by publicly criticizing Supreme Leader Khamenei. Mr. Pezeshkian defended the regime’s core principles that the United States is the main cause of tension in the region and welcomed cooperation with Russia as both countries are under sanctions. That is, in other words, Mr. Pezeshkian is a systemic reformist politician.

In this regard, it is important for Russia how the new president will build relations with the Russian Federation. As for Mr. Jalili, he adheres to a purely pragmatic line. In his opinion, Tehran should take advantage of the difficult situation in and around the Russian Federation and obtain the greatest economic and political benefits. But at the same time, he emphasizes that Russia is not a very great friend for Iran. Masoud Pezeshkian, with all his commitment to “multi-vectorism,” views Russia as a reliable partner, as do China and India.

Therefore, a few days before the second round of elections, it is still difficult to say what their outcome will be. Too powerful, and in many ways antagonistic (though only within the framework of Iranian laws) forces are fighting.

If in the fundamentalist-conservative camp the picture is generally clear: supporters of all principalist candidates are ready to vote for Jalili, then among reformist supporters the situation is more complicated. In many ways, the result of the voting will depend on the ability of the reformists to unite and attract to the ballot boxes either those who deliberately spoiled the ballots (and there are more than 1 million people), or those who did not vote at all.

Today, in contrast to the last three national elections to the Majlis and presidential elections (in 2020 – 2024), reformists and pragmatic centrists who have joined them are conducting organized campaigns in support of their elected representatives. Among those who supported M. Pezeshkian are the Reformist Front, which includes more than 30 factions; former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani; senior members of the Rouhani administration, such as Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and many, many other reputable politicians, cultural and sports figures. It is quite possible that young people, as they say in Iran, Generation Z, will join them. Whether they will be able to mobilize the masses of their political supporters or not – the results of the 2024 presidential elections in Iran will depend on this.