Vladimir Sazhin, PhD in History, Senior Researcher, Center for the Study of Middle East Countries, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor

On Tuesday, September 24, 2024, the 79th UN General Assembly began its work at the UN headquarters in New York. Its start is represented by the High Week, including the Future Summit, during which the heads of state, government and delegations of 193 UN member states will present their views on the current situation on the planet and the prospects for its peaceful future.

At the same time, the significance and value of the annual Assembly of the main international organization lies not only in the official plenary sessions, but also in numerous, sometimes informal, behind-the-scenes and even unadvertised contacts of high-ranking representatives of countries with those colleagues from other states, the dialogue with whom is of vital interest. This fully applies to the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), which arrived in New York under the leadership of the new president of the country Masoud Pezeshkian. The extremely representative Iranian delegation consists of 40 members, including three key figures from the 2015 nuclear negotiating team: former Foreign Minister and current Vice President, Pezeshkian’s deputy Mohammad Javad Zarif; Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi; and Araghchi’s deputy Majid Takht-Ravanchi.

This indicates that there will be a dialogue at the UN headquarters on the future of the Iranian nuclear program and, accordingly, on the lifting or easing of Western financial and economic sanctions related to the Iranian atom.

Indeed, Abbas Araghchi has repeatedly said that the Iranian delegation is arriving in New York not only to participate in the Future Summit and the UN General Assembly meeting. According to him, Tehran also expects to resume negotiations on the nuclear deal. Iranian diplomats will work on a new cycle of negotiations on the nuclear program within the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Upon arrival in New York, President Pezeshkian said that his administration is ready to negotiate the revival of the JCPOA within the framework of noble diplomacy.

Of course Iran is currently extremely interested in solving its nuclear problem, which gives it hope for the lifting or, at worst, easing of tough financial and economic sanctions. It is no secret that sanctions have a strong negative impact on the economic and socio-political situation in Iran.

The economic situation in Iran is extremely difficult and has been in crisis for quite a long time in many aspects. The standard of living and social well-being of the population are constantly falling, and discontent is spreading to an ever-increasing number of Iranians. All of this is fraught with serious problems for the well-being of the current Iranian regime. This situation, of course, requires active actions from the leadership of the IRI. This is why the large Iranian delegation at the General Assembly is trying to move the issue of sanctions forward. On September 23, at the UN headquarters, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a round table with the heads of American media. At the meeting, he stated that the Islamic Republic is fully prepared to return to its obligations under the agreement if the United States and European participants in the deal also fulfill their obligations. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on September 24, M. Pezeshkian once again confirmed Iran’s readiness to interact with other countries on its nuclear program.

Minister Abbas Araghchi also noted Iran’s desire to reach agreements on the nuclear issue negotiations. He said he was ready to start negotiations on the nuclear program on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly summit in New York if other parties wanted it. Mr. Araghchi added that he would stay in New York a few days longer than the Iranian president and hold more meetings with foreign ministers. “We,” the minister noted, “will focus our efforts on starting a new round of negotiations on the nuclear agreement.” Abbas Araghchi took the first step in this direction by meeting with IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi in New York on September 24. In all likelihood, after this meeting, Mr. Grossi said that the United States plays a central role in the negotiations on resuming the deal on the Iranian nuclear program. According to him, without Washington’s participation, this deal is not possible.

Meanwhile the Iranian minister rejected the possibility of meeting with his American counterpart in New York. Observers still do not rule out that the Iranian minister or his deputy may hold several unpublicized meetings with American diplomats. It should be noted that the Iranian-American dialogue on the Iranian nuclear problem, albeit indirectly, but through intermediaries, has been ongoing for a long time with varying degrees of intensity. As noted by the world media, the Iranian and American sides, at closed negotiations through intermediaries in Oman back in 2023, defined the points of mutual preliminary agreements, their content and the responsibilities of each of the parties. In short, it is presented as follows: Iran undertakes to: refrain from enriching uranium above 60%; cease or slow down the accumulation of enriched uranium at this level; expand cooperation with the IAEA; cease attacks by proxy-allied pro-Iranian groups in Iraq and Syria on American troops, civilian employees and contractors; refrain from supplying ballistic missiles to Russia.

The US undertakes to: abandon some anti-Iranian sanctions (in particular, lift sanctions on Iranian oil exports); refrain from tightening sanctions against Iran; refrain from pressuring the IAEA or the UN Security Council to take punitive measures against Tehran for its nuclear activities; stop detaining oil tankers with Iranian oil. The agreement on the exchange of prisoners, as well as the unfreezing of Iranian assets around the world, was important for the parties.

What is the format, status, and legal basis of these Iranian-American agreements? It is clear that this is not a treaty or an agreement. These are just gentlemen’s agreements.

As IAEA Director General Grossi noted, the IRI-US dialogue continues. But it must be noted that this is not enough to fully resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. An international agreement is needed (although the work of the Iranian-American dialogue would be useful).

True, the question arises: an agreement on what? On returning to the JCPOA? On a new format of agreements on the Iranian nuclear issue? Perhaps the second option is relevant today. And here’s why. By now, the JCPOA has really died. And there is no longer any hope for the revival of that deal in its previous form. There are two reasons for this.

First, the main points of the JCPOA expire in 2025.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the level of development of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure compared to 2018 (the year the United States withdrew from the deal) has grown significantly in almost all points of the JCPOA.

Thus, according to the latest IAEA data (August 2024), in accordance with the requirements of the JCPOA, Iran can only have 6,104 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges, while now they have 16,900. In violation of the JCPOA, Iran installed improved and more efficient IR-2 – IR-9 centrifuges. The IAEA does not provide an exact number of improved centrifuges, but in terms of enrichment capacity, the entire complex of centrifuges in Iran corresponds to approximately 25-30 thousand IR-1 centrifuges. The permissible levels of uranium enrichment under the JCPOA are 3.67%, and the Iranians are already producing 60% uranium. All enriched uranium reserves should not exceed 300 kg. And only it would be done at the level of 3.67%. And now Iran has almost 5,000 kg of uranium of various enrichment levels, of which 814 kg are 20% and 165 kg are 60% enriched.

It is absolutely clear that returning to the 2015 JCPOA is impossible. Iran will never agree to dismantle the recently created, fairly advanced nuclear infrastructure, to nullify all the achievements made by 2024. After all, based on the data on the development of the Iranian nuclear program, it can be argued that Iran needs no more than two to three weeks to obtain the necessary amount of weapons-grade 90% uranium, and about two to three years to create a nuclear warhead for missiles. Of course if a political decision is made at the highest level in Iran. However, even without such a political decision by the Iranian leadership, Iran’s successes in the nuclear sphere are, of course, the most important trump card in the hands of the Iranians in future nuclear negotiations. This means that a new format of the nuclear agreement is needed, reflecting the current state of the Iranian nuclear sphere, Iran’s right to have and develop its peaceful nuclear program under strict control of the IAEA. It appears that the new JCPOA-02 will be based on freezing Iran’s nuclear infrastructure at the current level (without destroying it) under full and multilateral control by the IAEA based on Iran’s compliance with the requirements of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and the amended Code 3.1.

Let one recall: The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements requires countries to provide the IAEA with more complete information on all aspects of their nuclear activities, expands the IAEA’s rights in carrying out inspection activities, including the possibility of conducting unannounced inspections and “snap” inspections with less than 24 hours’ notice of international inspectors’ visits to facilities, and much more. The amended Code 3.1 to the Agreement with the IAEA on the Application of Safeguards requires informing the IAEA about the start of construction of nuclear facilities immediately, and not 180 days before the receipt of nuclear materials, as was previously the case.

Thus, the path to a nuclear agreement with Iran will be long and difficult. And the reasons for this are not only the extreme complexity of the subject itself, but also the political problems within Iran and within the United States. It is known that not everyone in the IRI is ready for nuclear compromises with the West. On the other hand, America is not up to nuclear negotiations now. On November 5, there will be a presidential election that will largely determine the future directions of US foreign policy, including the Iranian nuclear issue. Only after January 2025, when the new president takes office, will it be possible to analyze the prospects for solving this important problem.

However, the active and persistent work of President Pezeshkian and his team at the UN General Assembly shows that today the issue of lifting sanctions is at the forefront of the IRI’s policy, which is naturally directly related to the solution of the Iranian nuclear program. This instills hope that a compromise on these issues can be found, despite all possible political processes and excesses in the United States.