Recently, relations between Pakistan, which some experts also call the “dark horse” of South Asia, and the countries of Central Asia (CA), primarily with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have been developing more and more actively and successfully. There is a certain explanation for this fact – Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan believes that Islamabad can connect Central Asia with the rest of the world through aviation, road and rail transport. He expressed this idea while speaking at the business forum “Central and South Asia 2021: Regional Connectivity. Challenges and Opportunities”, which took place not so long ago in Uzbekistan. “Pakistan has huge potential to connect Central Asia with the rest of the world and turn it into a trading hub,” Khan said at the time.

It should be noted that the strengthening of cooperation between Islamabad and the Central Asian states is taking place against the backdrop of changing regional dynamics. This became especially noticeable after the US left Afghanistan in a hurry and in disgrace last August. Islamabad sees the potential for rapprochement with the same Uzbekistan through this country. According to Khan, “Pakistan seeks peace in Afghanistan and sees it as vital to trade ties between the countries of the Central Asian region.”

Now Pakistan wants to get in touch with Uzbekistan through the railroad through Afghanistan. Back in February 2021, an agreement was signed on the construction of a railway along the route Termez – Mazari-Sharif – Kabul – Peshawar. The project is designed for five years, the length of the railway line will be 600 km. This project will increase the trade turnover between the three states and connect two important regions – Central and South Asia. In addition, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan will have access to Pakistani seaports. This is very important for Tashkent as it seeks to diversify its access to the sea beyond relying solely on Iranian ports.

Uzbekistan considers this project a priority for a number of reasons. Firstly, this railway route will be the shortest way to the sea. Secondly, it will connect the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China corridor with Europe and South Asia. Thirdly, given the factor of rivalry between the US and Iran, Uzbekistan seeks to ensure its security and choice of transit routes. Tashkent has invested heavily in the transport sector to connect Iranian ports with Uzbekistan, but fears that Tehran’s conflict with Washington could cost it dearly.

Further, we note that also in February 2021, the construction of a power transmission line (TL) from Tajikistan to Pakistan began. A little earlier, an agreement was signed on transit transportation between Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and China. Let’s not forget that the shortest, simplest and most economical route to the Arabian Sea for the Central Asian states passes through Pakistani territory. At the same time, Islamabad is ready to help the countries of this region increase trade through the use of its sea routes. In addition, Pakistan is now focusing on geo-economics, which can strengthen Islamabad’s relationship with the states of Central Asia.

It should be emphasized that Imran Khan’s idea of ​​”connecting the Central Asian states with the rest of the world” fits well into Pakistan’s strategic plans. Thus, Islamabad in relation to Central Asia pursues the following five main goals: strong political relations, trade and communications, investment and cooperation in the energy sector, defense and security, as well as establishing contacts between the peoples of the region within the framework of Islamic solidarity. To this we can add that Pakistan does not forget about the military-strategic aspects of developing ties with the Central Asian countries. For Islamabad, Afghanistan and Central Asia is a strategic and friendly rear in the confrontation with India.

As for the Central Asian states, Pakistan’s goal here is to create a friendly environment. Islamabad would not like India’s influence to increase in this region, because in this case Pakistan would find itself in a kind of unfriendly environment both from the front (from India) and from the rear (Afghanistan and Central Asia). That is why Islamabad very zealously follows the activity of New Delhi in this region and, as far as possible, tries to oppose something to this. Another thing is that the capabilities of Pakistan itself do not allow Islamabad to seriously increase its presence in Central Asia. However, this is partly offset by increased activity in Central Asia by Pakistan-friendly China.

Islamabad, it must be emphasized, has been trying to increase its influence in the region since the moment the former Soviet Central Asian republics gained their independence and have put a lot of effort into this. But the unstable situation in Afghanistan seriously hampered the successful implementation of his plans. Now that the country is undergoing changes, Islamabad hopes to gain secure access to Central Asia and beyond.

However, life does not stand still. Strengthening trade and economic ties between the Central Asian states and Pakistan is a matter of time. Separate successful economic projects, in particular, those listed above, are already beginning to be implemented in practice. Cooperation in the field of logistics, business, education is also gradually developing. The fact that both the Central Asian countries and Pakistan are cooperating closely with China may play a role. And the Chinese initiative “One belt – one road”, in turn, is able to bring the countries of this region even closer, connecting Pakistan with Central Asia and regions beyond its borders.

At the same time, it should be noted that, in general, Pakistan’s influence on the Central Asian countries is very limited today. This is due to the fact that the vectors of economic and political interaction between Pakistan and the states of the Central Asian region have historically been directed in different directions and, in general, to this day remain such by inertia. There is a certain level of alienation from Islamabad in the Central Asian states, perception of it as an alien element.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the authorities of the country of the Central Asian region, especially Tajikistan, are worried about the activity of the Taliban (the Taliban is banned in Russia) and other armed groups on the territory of Afghanistan. And the capabilities of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to influence armed groups in Afghanistan are well known and studied.

Here, perhaps, it should be noted that after the seizure of power in Afghanistan by the Taliban, the Pakistani special services noticeably intensified their work in the Central Asian republics. Pakistani emissaries from the special services and their proxies pay special attention to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, in particular, to the Pamir region, thereby seeking to influence the Afghan policy of official Dushanbe. In this regard, the leadership of the countries of the Central Asian region needs to be on the alert, and Moscow needs to look for effective response measures to protect its interests both in the Pamirs and in the region as a whole.

Apparently, in the foreseeable future, the interaction of the Central Asian states with Pakistan will continue to be limited, although it will gradually develop. Along with this, the cooperation of the Central Asian states with neighboring India will develop at a more active pace, but is unlikely to reach the same scale as interaction with Russia or China.