Sergey Saenko, international observer

The Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) has been and remains a strategically important area for Russia. By and large, the past year has dotted all the i’s: the dialogue with Tokyo has actually been frozen, Seoul has been forced to move away from Moscow with the hope of restoring dialogue in the future, and there is a fierce rivalry between Russia and the West for friendship with New Delhi. Basically, relations in this region have successfully developed only with China, and even then with certain reservations. We will try to figure out what prospects await Moscow in the IPR.

The year that has gone down in history has clearly shown that a “reset” of relations with the West turned out to be impossible, and Russia turned its attention to the East. Moreover, this reversal reflects Moscow’s desire to end US hegemony and build a multipolar world. And the stronger the position of Russia in the ITR, the more real such a world order will become. However, to begin with, it is necessary to clearly understand and fully realize that this region is very complex in many respects. Starting from Comrade Sukhov’s already famous phrase “East is a delicate matter” to the intricacies of political and economic ties between the individual states of the IPR could be applied. At the same time, of course, one cannot ignore the special role of the United States in the region.

It is quite obvious that the center of what is happening today in the IPR is, first of all, a complex of complex relations between the United States and another global player, which is already modern China. In this regard, one of the tasks of the United States in the region is to prevent China from rapprochement with Russia. Washington, apparently, is well aware that the current positioning of Beijing and Moscow to each other in the “back to back” format provides China with a reliable rear in its confrontation with the United States. And for this reason, the White House will continue to try to “drive a wedge” between Beijing and Moscow, preventing their further rapprochement.

On the other hand, the “pivot to the East” (albeit still slow) of the Russian state machine, within which the process of rapprochement with the PRC is located, is primarily due to the objective process of shifting the center of world political and economic life to the IPR. Moreover, this “reversal” has only accelerated due to those very “external” efforts to break off cooperation between Russia and Europe. That is, the provocation of the conflict in Ukraine has already led to an effect that is directly opposite to that expected by the Western initiators of this conflict.

In the current situation in the IPR today, Russia’s role is seen as helping in every way to reduce the level of tension in China’s relations with Japan and India, the three main Asian players in the region. Such a task seems almost impossible (especially in the format of the first pair), but this should not mean abandoning attempts to solve it, since without this a decrease in the tension of the situation in the IPR should hardly be expected. Moreover, this is clearly not included in the plans of Washington, which has been persistently putting together blocs (AUKUS, QUAD) to contain China in this region lately.

It is no secret that 2022 has forced Russia to take a fresh look at India. New Delhi was previously considered a reliable partner of Moscow, but the forced break with the West led to the strengthening of Russian-Indian economic ties. Thus, last year a record growth in mutual trade was recorded, which, according to Indian statistics, exceeded $31 billion, while in 2021 it was only $12 billion. 25% of Indian imports, as well as a significant increase in exports of fertilizers and agricultural products should be noted. In addition, New Delhi has demonstrated its readiness to expand mutually beneficial cooperation with our country on the basis of sovereign decisions, without succumbing to outside dictates, primarily the United States.

However, it should be noted that such progress in relations is not typical for all countries in the region. Recall that in March last year, the Russian government approved a list of unfriendly states, which included, in particular, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Such a decision cannot be called unfounded: for example, after the start of Special Military Operation in Ukraine, Tokyo imposed sanctions against 15 people and nine organizations from Russia. In addition, the Japanese government adopted restrictions on Russian banks, in particular against Sberbank and Alfa-Bank, and also imposed a ban on investments in Russia.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida also recently announced his readiness to continue imposing restrictions on our country in 2023. It is not at all surprising in this regard that the press secretary of the President of Russia Dmitry Peskov spoke about the impossibility of continuing the dialogue with Japan. Moscow, for example, refused to continue discussing the status of the Kuril Islands, and at the same time the issue of concluding a peace treaty was removed from the agenda of bilateral relations. In turn, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed an order to abolish the visa-free regime for visiting territories for citizens of an unfriendly country.

We add that official Seoul has also joined the anti-Russian sanctions, which, however, does not demonstrate Japanese zeal in breaking off relations with Moscow. Although today it is hardly possible to call relations between Russia and South Korea normal. However, as the Russian proverb says: “There is no evil without good.” So, earlier, South Korean Foreign Minister Pak Chyna said that Seoul hopes to restore relations with Moscow after the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis.

There is no doubt that the Chinese factor is extremely important in Russia’s relations with the countries of the region. However, the ambitions of Beijing and the historical role of the “Asian hegemon” cannot but confuse the powers located in the neighborhood of China. Russia’s choice in favor of a strategic partnership with the Middle Kingdom, of course, is justified from the point of view of the geopolitical situation, but it causes concern on the part of other regional actors. And not only is meant India, but also a number of countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which play an important role in the IPR. And for this reason, Moscow should pay special attention to the development of relations with the ASEAN countries and make special efforts for this.

Russia’s development of cooperation with the countries of the Association is especially important now, when Moscow is making a “strategic turn to the East.” In addition to being an economic organization, ASEAN also deals with globally significant political issues, which further enhances its role not only in the IPR, but also in the world. After the total problems with the West that arose in 2014, it is important for Russia to rely on someone in the East. And system integration associations are best suited for this. There are enough of them in Asia – suffice it to name such a forum as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the regular East Asia Summit in Vladivostok. Yet ASEAN stands out even among them.

Thus, we can conclude that a multipolar world is impossible without a common polyphony of the countries of the East, where the voices of Russia and China, as well as India, Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN countries will be heard. The development of multilateral diplomacy in the IPR, including with unfriendly countries, is the main task that Moscow must set for itself in 2023 and in the future, responding to the challenges of the West in Asia.