Yuri Veselov, military observer

Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated his Uzbek counterpart Shavkat Mirziyoyev on his 67th anniversary by telephone on July 24, after which they had a detailed conversation about further deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance between the two countries. The heads of state discussed the results of the initiatives proposed during the Russian President’s visit to Uzbekistan on May 26-28, 2024.

Russia is among the countries that have made great progress in relations with Uzbekistan, being the largest export market for this country and the leader in the number of joint ventures with foreign capital. Over the past seven years, the volume of mutual trade has increased 2.5 times and reached 10 billion dollars. The leaders of both countries at the last talks in Tashkent set an ambitious goal – to increase the trade turnover to 30 billion dollars by 2030.

In general, Vladimir Putin’s last state visit to Uzbekistan was marked by, one might say, a breakthrough in relations with this Central Asian republic. As a result, agreements and long-term plans were signed to expand long-term economic cooperation worth more than $20 billion. And the total portfolio of projects exceeded $45 billion. Such a breakthrough became possible after the adoption of a new constitution in Uzbekistan, which allowed Shavkat Mirziyoyev to carry out a number of important economic and social reforms that improved the investment climate, stimulated business activity among broad sections of the population, reformed the judicial system, increased the importance of local authorities and established connections between ordinary people and the central leadership.

The process of expanding relations with Russia began in 2016 after President Mirziyoyev came to power, who had previously headed a number of regions of the republic and then served as the country’s prime minister for 13 years. It must be frankly said that under the previous leader Islam Karimov, the foreign and domestic policies of the leadership can be characterized in many ways as isolationist. Uzbekistan twice entered and left the CIS and CSTO, refrained from developing ties with other Central Asian republics and with Russia. Laws and regulations were in effect in relation to its population that limited the migration of people from rural areas to cities, introduced a quantitative qualification for budget education in higher and secondary educational institutions, and other measures. The current authorities have removed many distortions and restrictions. The foreign policy of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev is characterized by a balance of international relations, in which Russia occupies a leading position. China is in second place and prefers to cooperate in the field of trade to a greater extent. Uzbekistan, despite an acute shortage of its own energy resources, continues to sell natural gas to China. And the Chinese are in no hurry to invest in Uzbek economic projects, although agreements and plans exist for some of them.

Uzbekistan has been trying to join the WTO for a long time, but the prospects for achieving this goal are becoming increasingly distant due to administrative complications within this organization. The republic does not seek full accession to the EAEU, remaining in it as an observer. Of course, the Uzbek leadership is interested in developing relations with the United States and Western European countries, but it has not been possible to establish strong trusting ties with them. Thus, there were agreements with the Americans on financing the construction of a railway from Tashkent to Afghanistan, but after the Yankees fled this country, the project was forgotten in Washington. As for the European countries, they consider Uzbekistan a state that is backward in economic and socio-political development and the promises in the sphere of investment and the economy that pour out like a horn of plenty are not supported by deeds.

An indicator of the attitude towards Uzbekistan is the annual research conducted by the American non-governmental organization Freedom House, which determines the country’s rating on a number of indicators. Research is conducted in the areas of economy, markets, the state and development of society and education, freedom and democracy, the state of the media and other areas. Uzbekistan is at the bottom of the list of 100 countries studied according to the main indicators (GDP, economy, markets, education). Thus, in the new Freedom in the World 2024 rating, Uzbekistan scored 12 points out of 100 possible (2 points for political rights and 10 for civil liberties) and is included in the list of unfree countries. We will consider the question of the objectivity of such “research” rhetorical. Moscow does not hide its interest in developing multilateral ties with Tashkent, which initiates this process with its policies and activities. It must be recognized that Vladimir Putin managed to establish such trusting personal relations with Shavkat Mirziyoyev that he does not have with other leaders of Central Asian countries. Russia is attracted by the internal stability of Uzbekistan and the plans of its leadership to increase the GDP to 100 billion dollars in the next five years. And only Russians are reliable partners and allies in achieving this ambitious goal.

Uzbekistan ranks second in the CIS in natural gas production and fourth after Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in its reserves. At the same time, in recent years the country has transformed from an exporter to an importer of gas. The reason for this was a significant increase in the consumption of blue fuel and electricity by industrial enterprises, while gas fields are not concentrated in one geographical area (for example, as in Turkmenistan), but are scattered over a large territory. Another factor is the deterioration of the infrastructure facilities of the industry, which requires large capital investments. Energy in general is a restraining factor in the development of the economy of Uzbekistan. According to experts, by 2030 the country’s need for electricity will double. During the high-level talks held in May, an agreement was reached to increase the supply of Russian gas. A decision was made to use the Central Asia – Center gas pipeline system built during the Soviet Union, the operation of which is currently stopped, for the reverse flow of blue fuel. Gazprom and Lukoil have been actively operating in Uzbekistan for many years, are the most important investors in the energy sector and provide the main increase in gas production.

But even this will not completely solve the problem. About ten years ago, an agreement was signed between the countries on the construction of a low-power nuclear power plant in the republic, but the project was never implemented due to the indecisiveness of the Uzbek side. And only in May, the presidents of both countries returned to discussing this problem and agreed to launch the construction of a nuclear power plant that will provide 20% of Uzbekistan’s electricity needs. In recent years, the republic has been experiencing a demographic boom. If in the early 90’s of the last century the population was 4.3 million people, then at present it has exceeded 36 million. According to forecasts, by the end of 2040 it will increase to 40 million citizens. According to data for 2022, approximately 530 thousand students completed 9th grade education in schools, of which 321 thousand completed 11th grade. Some young people continued their education in higher and secondary specialized institutions, while others (the overwhelming majority) entered the labor market.

There is an acute shortage of higher education institutions to provide the economy and social sector with qualified personnel. And this is despite the presence of more than 20 branches of Russian universities in the country. The Uzbek leadership does not hide the fact that the country is in dire need of specialists. In May, an agreement was reached to open a branch of the Russian Bauman Technical University in Tashkent. Despite the economic recovery, most of the population, and especially young people, cannot find worthy employment and are forced to look for work outside the country. Naturally, a significant part of them joins the army of labor immigrants in Russia. It is believed that at present the number of Uzbeks employed in Russian construction sites and in the service sector fluctuates between 3-3.5 million people. The wages they transfer to their homeland help support the material well-being of their families. The amount of annual remittances averages from $5 to 10 billion. The record year was 2022 – $16.9 billion.

Islam Karimov’s rule was marked by the transition of the written language to the Latin alphabet in the early 1990s and the recognition of the Uzbek language as the only state language. A sharp reduction in the number of schools teaching subjects in Russian followed. As a result, the vast majority of the population and young people, especially in rural areas, do not speak Russian. This is where the difficulties with workers coming to Russia come from, despite the efforts of the Uzbek authorities to regulate migration and sift candidates. Uzbeks require a special patent to work in Russia, while, for example, citizens of Kyrgyzstan do not need one. This is explained by the fact that in Kyrgyzstan, Russian is considered a national language, and Russian is studied in schools as a second native language. It should be noted that the transition to a balanced foreign policy and greater openness in cooperation with Europe has led to the active emergence of foreign non-governmental organizations in Uzbekistan, which feed local “independent” bloggers who are setting Uzbek society on a path of mistrust of the government and a critical attitude towards the reforms being carried out in the Republic. Quite naturally, the change in the leadership of Uzbekistan has given rise to increased activity among the dissatisfied.

The fugitive embezzler of the Public Fund for the Disabled of Uzbekistan, Hasanboy Burkhanov, is currently laying claim to the leadership of the so-called opposition. Accused by a Tashkent court of official negligence, theft by misappropriation or embezzlement of more than 32 thousand dollars, Burkhanov fled the country in 2012 to Germany to avoid punishment, where he received citizenship a year later as a political refugee. There he founded the opposition movement “Free Uzbekistan”, which exists on funds from foreign funds, voluntary donations and targeted contributions from his supporters. According to Burkhanov himself, his movement does not enjoy wide support inside Uzbekistan. As an “opposition leader”, he maintains close ties with the OSCE, periodically giving reports and lectures in Berlin, Warsaw, Vienna, Vilnius. It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that Western intelligence services are supervising his activities, hoping to make an “Uzbek Navalny” out of him in the future. So far it hasn’t worked out very well, as they say, “the pipe is lower and the smoke is thinner.” Military and military-technical cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia is of a closed nature. Interaction and cooperation exists through the ministries of internal affairs and special services in the field of combating organized crime, terrorism and counteracting drug smuggling on the basis of departmental agreements.

Russia attaches great importance to strengthening its influence in Uzbekistan, which is located in the center of Eurasia, at the crossroads of traditional transport routes from Russia to China and Afghanistan. The national interests of Moscow and Tashkent objectively contribute to the further development of mutually beneficial cooperation. Let us hope that this will be the case despite the machinations of geopolitical enemies.