Andrey Areshev, political scientist

On August 24, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu received in Ankara a deputation of the Syrian opposition consisting of the heads of the “National Coalition of Revolutionary Forces” Salem al-Meslet, the “Negotiating Committee” Badr Jamus and the “Prime Minister” of the so-called. “interim government” in Idlib Abdulrahman Mustafa. The day before, the head of Turkish diplomacy once again noted the need to take steps to establish a lasting peace in Syria in accordance with UN Security Council resolution No. 2254, adding that the “Assad regime” should not consider the opposition as terrorists.

Recall that on August 12, after a pause after talks in Sochi between the presidents of Russia and Turkey, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the same Cavusoglu spoke in favor of finding ways of reconciliation between the opposition and the government in Damascus, which provoked mass protests in northwestern Syria (in Afrin, El-Babe, Jarablus and other areas), accompanied by loud chants and burning of the “sacred” Turkish flag. It is characteristic that this happened in the territories controlled by the “kahraman memetchiku”, economically dependent on the northern neighbor and, to one degree or another, integrated into the Turkish administrative system, which caused outrage in the Turkish media and among users of social networks.

It is also known that Ankara periodically threatens with another invasion of northern Syria, the purpose of which is to close the 30-kilometer “buffer zone” along the entire line of the southern border of the country. In addition to protecting against attacks by PKK militants, it is planned to resettle some of the Syrian refugees from Turkey (up to 4 million in total) to these territories, significantly complicating the socio-economic situation in the country.

The idea of ​​a new military intervention, preparations for which have not stopped over the past few months, does not cause enthusiasm either in Moscow, or in Washington, or in Tehran. As it became clear from some statements by Erdogan and Cavusogu, the Russian side is persistently and consistently working towards the prospect of improving Turkish-Syrian relations, based on the common interests of Ankara and Damascus. As follows from a number of near-diplomatic leaks, Iran, the UAE and even Qatar are working in the same direction – once one of the most consistent and implacable sponsors of the religiously motivated and other “armed opposition”.

It seems that despite Turkey’s many years of efforts to overthrow the “Assad regime”, the sprouts of a mind not clouded by ideological prejudices are gradually making their way. In particular, recently answering a question about possible negotiations with Damascus, the Turkish president replied in the sense that diplomatic ties cannot be completely severed, and with regard to Syria, “further steps must be taken.” According to Erdogan, his country’s goal is not to defeat Assad, but to find a political solution to more than a decade of crisis.

All this is in tune with the approaches of the Turkish opposition, and above all, the “People’s Republicans” Kemal Kılıçdarogu (a native of the Alawite milieu), who maintained contacts with the government in Damascus. For some time now, even the leader of the right-wing radical Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahceli, has joined the chorus of sober voices, which in itself is quite characteristic. Talks between intelligence chiefs Hakan Fidan and Ali Mamluk are no secret, discussing border security issues and options for returning to the 1998 “Adan Accords” – of course, taking into account new realities.

In September, the leader of the Motherland Party, Dogu Perincek, is going to Damascus at the head of a delegation that includes some retired ministers and diplomats. It is reported that a report on the trip (including a meeting with Assad), during which they will discuss ways to restore relations, the joint fight against terrorism and the return of refugees, will be presented to the Turkish authorities. A well-known politician with a rich biography, a native of southern Gaziantep, already held a similar meeting in March 2015, but then the situation in Syria and around it was fundamentally different: relying on the consolidated support of regional and Western players, the terrorists laid siege to the center of Damascus and, it would seem, were one step away from victory.

However, the Russian military operation launched six months later, backed up by active diplomacy, made it possible, although not immediately, to radically change both the situation on the battlefield and the international context of the “Syrian issue”. And now, according to the information of the Iranian agency Tasnim, in the event of a successful outcome of the mission of the Perincek delegation, the leaders of Turkey and Syria can meet on the sidelines of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on September 15-16 in Samarkand, where they both received an invitation from the Russian president.

“The settlement process in Syria can be accelerated with the adoption of a new constitution. This should be done as soon as possible, after which elections should be held and a legitimate government should be formed based on the results of the vote,” Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar expressed this opinion on A Haber TV channel on August 26. Answering a question about the possibility of direct negotiations with Damascus after an 11-year break, he noted: “Our president and foreign minister have already spoken about the prospects for establishing contacts. Negotiations depend on certain conditions and situations. We are closely monitoring the process with this in mind.” Despite some vagueness of these formulations, they seem to lack the former intransigence and determination to support ideologically close forces in the neighboring country at any cost, regardless of anything.

At the same time, the militants of the “Syrian National Army”, with the support of the Turkish army, launched a series of attacks on the Kurdish forces along the line of contact in Tal-Rifaat, Manbij, Ain-Issa, Kobani and Tal-Tamer. Additional reinforcements of the Turkish army continue to be transferred to the adjacent Syrian territory. Syrian military personnel also come under attack from time to time. So, on August 16, the Turks fired at one of the SAA facilities west of Kobani, as a result of which three soldiers were killed and six wounded. The Turkish Ministry of Defense claims that the strike was a response to a mortar attack on a Turkish border post, but there is no evidence for this. The next day, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a drone attacked government forces at the Mennag military airfield in northern Aleppo province. Local shelling and attacks did not stop in the following days.

One gets the impression that in Ankara, in this way, they make it clear that any “peacekeeping” initiatives will continue to be accompanied by forceful pressure, and that there is no talk of ending the occupation of Syrian lands under any circumstances. Meanwhile, it is the unconditional withdrawal of Turkish troops that is one of the main demands of official Damascus. This circumstance alone does not inspire excessive optimism regarding the specific results of possible semi-official contacts and related conversations. Too serious inertia of hostility has been accumulated over the past decade, and the successful outcome of the 2023 election cycle for Erdogan, it is possible, will lead to another change in rhetoric.

And yet, regardless of any conjuncture and the intrigues of internal and external opponents, the gradual normalization of Turkish-Syrian relations is an uncontested condition for solving many of the problems existing in Turkey, and this cannot be ignored. It could contribute to the establishment of at least relative stability in the Middle East, but not all geopolitical players are interested in such a development of events.