Andrey Areshev, political researcher

Speaking on March 31 during an informal online summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking States (Turkic Council), Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke about the importance of developing “logistics and cargo transportation among the countries of the Turkic world”. In his opinion, it is important to “speed up negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on international combined freight transport”. Continuous deliveries along the so – called “Middle Transport Corridor” through the Caspian Sea will increase the “strategic weight and prosperity of our countries” and the involvement of other countries, including European ones, in the Council’s activities. The representative office of the Turkic Council, which is supposed to be transformed into the “Organization of Turkic – speaking States” by the end of the year, has been established in Hungary (observer state).

Declaring the city of Turkestan in the south of Kazakhstan “the spiritual capital of the Turkic world”, the leaders of the” Turkic Council ” agreed that other ancient cities of the area of residence of the Turkic-speaking peoples in the future can also be given a similar status on a rotational basis. Recall that the “Turkic Council” itself appeared in 2009 as an informal (for the time being) integration project with the leading role of Ankara with its headquarters in Istanbul, increasingly positioning itself as a regional, if not global, center of power.

After the independence of the republics of the former Soviet Central Asia in the early 1990s’, they were considered by Ankara as priority trade and economic partners, cooperation with which was facilitated by ethno-linguistic proximity and a common cultural and historical heritage. In recent months, especially after the end of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2020, Turkey has intensified military-technical cooperation with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (the latter two countries are both members of the CSTO, the Eurasian Union and the “Turkic Council”, and Uzbekistan is an observer in the EEU). So far, relatively modest positions in regional trade do not prevent Ankara from striving to create the necessary prerequisites for the formation of a common market for goods, investments, labor and services by 2026-2028.

Despite the periodic “scandals in the noble family”, Turkey remains a member of NATO and is not going to leave there. Accordingly, the spread of its political, economic, cultural and ideological influence on the post-Soviet countries, at least in part, is embedded in the logic of the formation of a “belt of instability” along the borders of China and Russia. In the publications of some Western experts, it is said that Turkey and the West have a common interest in getting Central Asia out of the” geographical prison”, which implies a weakening of dependence on Russian, and especially on Chinese infrastructure.

Of course, Beijing and Moscow are well aware of this, promoting their own formats and mechanisms of multilateral regional cooperation, such as the “One Belt, One Road” or the Eurasian Economic Union. Even before the launch of major energy projects, China’s trade with Central Asian countries almost quadrupled in 2002-2005 – from $2.3 billion to $8.8 billion. By 2019, this figure rose to $46 billion, reflecting China’s strengthening position in key sectors of regional economies.

The need to protect the gas pipelines leading to China from Turkmenistan through the territories of several states dictates closer attention to regional security issues. So far, China’s direct military presence seems to be limited to (non-Turkic) Tajikistan and partly Afghanistan, from where the militants of the terrorist group “Islamic Party of Turkestan” (banned in the Russian Federation) can enter the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The” Uyghur issue ” has long had a negative impact on bilateral relations between China and Turkey. The Turkish opposition periodically accuses Erdogan of betraying the interests of the brothers from East Turkestan in the name of Chinese loans and promising East – West communication projects. In November 2015, the leaders of China and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding in Antalya, which provides for the integration of the Belt and Road and the Middle Corridor initiatives in the future.

In June 2019, the People’s Bank of China transferred another billion dollars of financial support to Turkey. On December 19, 2020, the first cargo train carrying cargo from Turkey to the Middle Kingdom along the “Trans-Caspian Corridor” completed its symbolic journey. The volume of bilateral trade reached $24 billion, making China the second most important trading partner of Ankara. At the same time, some promising deals were never implemented, quite possibly due to the fact that the Turkish authorities did not dare to offer lucrative contracts to Chinese firms considered as competitors.

Analyzing the balance of political forces in Central Asia, it is impossible not to take into account the role of the ubiquitous Washington. The rise of anti-Chinese and, to some extent, anti-Russian sentiment in the region, noted by many experts, can hardly be explained solely by internal factors. In a recent interview with the “Big Game” program, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated the unequivocal goal of the Americans – “in every possible way to weaken our ties with our allies and strategic partners” in Central Asia, including on the basis of the “C5+1” format (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan + the United States).

A year ago, while touring some of the capitals of Central Asia, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made no secret of Washington’s goals to turn the region into a long-term “headache” for Moscow and Beijing. Despite the “changing of the guard” in the White House and the State Department, the line to “contain” Moscow and Beijing under Biden takes on an even more pronounced character, and following Ankara in the wake of the policy of Western partners is obviously not the best choice. In particular, from the point of view of Turkey’s real, rather than declarative, integration into the Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative.

On March 26, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Ankara with President Erdogan, who had previously been publicly vaccinated with the Chinese coronavirus vaccine. The sides noted that the bilateral Sino-Turkish relations have entered a period of growth based on mutual benefit in recent years. Whether mutual benefit will conflict with the national interests of each of the parties and when this may happen is still difficult to answer.