Bulatov, international observer

On January 24, Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi visited Turkey to discuss the growing instability and escalatory trends in the Middle East region caused by the war in Gaza. And although this visit demonstrated the ability of Iran and Turkey to cooperate or at least coordinate their actions on common problematic issues, bilateral relations between the two countries remain difficult.

Over the centuries, tensions between Iran and Turkey have ebbed and flowed, but have remained ever-present in the competition for regional influence and supremacy. This uneasy relationship continues to this day, in some cases resulting in Tehran and Ankara supporting partners or allies fighting on opposite sides of the fence in conflicts including Syria, Iraq and the South Caucasus.

Iran’s northwestern province of West Azerbaijan, the most important economic and business corridor between Iran and Turkey, has turned into a complex tangle of confrontation between Ankara and Tehran. The region is home to a mixed population of mostly Sunni Kurds and Shia Azerbaijani-Turks, with the latter ethnic group dominating the former for decades. According to some estimates, the number of Turkish Azerbaijanis is more than 20 million people (about 24% of the total population of Iran).

Approximately the same number of ethnic Kurds live in Turkey (about 19% of the population of this country). In Iran, the Kurdish population is estimated at 8-12 million people. However, the status of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran differs from that of Kurds in both countries. For centuries, Turkish Azerbaijanis have been one of the pillars of the Iranian administration, and in recent times members of this community have wielded significant power, serving in Iran’s armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The territory of modern West Azerbaijan was the birthplace of Kurdish nationalism, the site of the creation of the first modern Kurdish political party, and the place where the Soviet Union helped form a short-lived Kurdish statehood (the Republic of Kurdistan) in 1946. However, modern Kurds living here face discrimination from local Azerbaijani-Turkish authorities. For example, when it comes to parliamentary elections, many Kurdish candidates approved by Tehran to run in the elections are subsequently rejected by local authorities in West Azerbaijan, which often operate independently of Tehran. Thus, tensions between the province’s two main ethnic groups continue unabated.

The complex and tense nature of inter-ethnic dynamics in the West Azerbaijan province, coupled with the close ethnic kinship of Turks and Azerbaijanis, has made the Azerbaijani-Turkish community an important target of Turkish outreach activities, which has raised concerns among Iranian authorities. The widespread use of satellite dishes and access to Turkish channels since the 1990s has significantly contributed to Turkey’s increased soft power among Iranian Turkish Azerbaijanis.

Many families in northwestern Iran, especially Turkish Azerbaijanis, regularly watch Turkish TV channels. In addition, through the Turkish consulate in the city of Urmia, Turkey is providing increasing support and training to local Azerbaijani-Turkish activists and journalists. Such influence and public diplomacy help promote the idea of Turkic solidarity. There has been a marked increase in Turkish language proficiency among the local population, leading to an increase in Turkish influence since the early 2000’s.

As a result of this policy, local Azerbaijani authorities in Western Azerbaijan added Azerbaijani-language place names to Farsi street names in that province’s capital, the city of Urmia. In addition, local Azerbaijani authorities insist on using the Azerbaijani language instead of Farsi in official meetings, which causes serious tensions with the Kurds.

As a result, there is a radicalization of Azerbaijani-Turkish nationalism. For example, recently, during football matches in Azerbaijani-speaking Iranian cities, fans often carry the flags of the Azerbaijani and Turkish Republics into the stadiums, chanting: “Persians, Kurds and Armenians are the enemies of Turkey,” which was even reflected in the Turkish media. Tehran is trying to downplay the impact of these demonstrations, which involve mostly young people, but the fact remains.

The region with a Kurdish population, which was divided between Iran and Turkey as a result of the wars between the Ottoman and Safavid empires, poses a challenge for Turkey in implementing its plan for Turkic peace and establishing direct contacts with the Azerbaijanis in Iran. In most border towns and villages on both sides of the Iran-Turkey border – as in villages on both sides of Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Syria – the Kurdish population is in the majority. It is noteworthy that the Kurds of Iran’s border areas adjacent to Turkey speak the same Kurmanji Kurdish dialect as Turkish Kurds, while Iranian Kurds living further from the border use the Sorani dialect.

Turkey claims that members and supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has opposed the Turkish government for the past 40 years, are present in border towns in Iranian Kurdistan. In 2020, Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu said there were 100 PKK fighters in the northwestern Iranian city of Maku and warned that if Iran did not remove them, Turkey would act, indirectly recalling Turkish actions against Kurdish militants in northern Syria.

As a result of policies pursued by both Iran and Turkey, tensions between the two ethnic groups in West Azerbaijan province escalated sharply and severely two years ago. In July 2022, clashes began between Kurdish and Azerbaijani smugglers in Maku. Following this, a group of Turkish Azerbaijanis attacked the Kurdish tent camp, armed with sticks, clubs and other weapons, as a result of which the tents of the nomadic Kurdish herders were burned and several people were killed. Subsequently, more than 120 Kurdish families along with their livestock (more than 20 thousand heads) were evicted by local authorities without compensation or explanation. Further escalating the situation, Turkish newspaper Yeni Safak reported that the incident was allegedly triggered by a PKK attack on ethnic Turks in Iran, and accused the Iranian government of collaborating with the Kurdish group.

Tehran, aware of the growing threat posed by Ankara’s support for Turkish Azerbaijanis within Iran’s borders, is belatedly attempting to reassert more centralized control over areas where Kurds and Azerbaijanis clash.

It is also noteworthy that former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, during his visit to East Azerbaijan in 2019, referred to West Azerbaijan as “Urmia,” the preferred name for the province for the Kurds. However, the use of this name was an attempt not only to appease the Kurds, but also to try to counter Ankara’s messages that view West Azerbaijan as part of the “Turkic world”.

Turkey’s support for Azerbaijanis in Iran in the context of the development of the Turkic world has intensified in the rhetoric of Turkish leaders in recent years. In late 2020, while taking part in a military parade in Baku to celebrate Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the 44-day war over Nagorno-Karabakh, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan read a short poem in which he symbolically called on all Turks to “liberate” Iranian West Azerbaijan. The furious reaction of the Iranians to this demarche was not long in coming – the Turkish ambassador was summoned to the Iranian Foreign Ministry for an explanation. Then-Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said Erdogan was unaware of the poem’s sensitivity to Tehran.

Iran, in turn, does not remain in debt and continues its long-term policy of supporting the PKK not only in order to weaken the opposition parties of the Iranian Kurds within the country, but also in order, if necessary, to confront its long-time rival in the region – Turkey. Tehran’s relationship with the PKK dates back to 1982, when Iran convinced Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani to allow the PKK to set up camps in northern Iraq.

Tehran’s policy towards the Kurds has its own history. When riots began in Iranian Kurdish cities following Turkey’s arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, rallies in his support quickly escalated into protests against the Iranian government for Kurdish rights. The government brutally suppressed the protests, killing dozens and arresting more than 2,000 people. Moreover, Iran demanded that the PKK leave its territory, although since 1987 it had given them permission to stay and establish a base there.

However, the 1999 protests in Iranian Kurdistan clearly demonstrated the PKK’s ability to gain widespread support among Iranian Kurds. Indeed, a significant number of Iranian Kurds joined the PKK after 1999. Given this circumstance, Iran made adjustments to its policy and began to support Kurdish Alevis (supporters of one of the forms of Shiite Islam), deliberately giving preference to their religious rather than Kurdish identity. This allowed Tehran to challenge Turkey while containing the Kurdish national movement at home.