Nikolay Bobkin, political scientist, Institute of the USA and Canada. Academician G.A. Arbatova

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres at a Security Council meeting on December 18 once again called on the United States to lift the embargo on Iranian oil imports and return to compliance with the nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

The Russian representative to the UN supported this proposal and confirmed that Russia does not see an alternative to the JCPOA, and the renewal of the agreement is crucial for global security and compliance with the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East. Concerns about the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program are not unfounded.

Verification and monitoring of the JCPOA by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently severely limited due to Iran’s halt to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA. Having abandoned the special regime of international control over its nuclear activities provided for by the nuclear agreement, Tehran proposes to further build relations between the IAEA and Iran within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as with any other country that has signed this treaty. In short, the Iranian leadership no longer wants IAEA officials to have special monitoring powers over their nuclear facilities, citing the JCPOA, which does not work without American participation.

Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) on December 20 after a cabinet meeting, commenting on the recent IAEA report expressing concern about unresolved nuclear issues in Iran, argued that the report is “politically biased and does not reflect the actual state of the Iranian nuclear program.” He called on the remaining parties to the JCPOA to return to their commitments to lift sanctions and stop forcing Iran to give up its nuclear rights. Eslami reiterated Iran’s position, saying: “Iran will not take a single step back from its peaceful nuclear program.” This development comes at a time when the world is focused on conflicts elsewhere.

The Biden administration does not trust such statements from Iranian officials. Washington believes that Tehran is increasingly preparing to create nuclear weapons, and connects this conclusion with the current situation in the Middle East. Following the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, President Biden warned Iran not to use its proxies in the region and to enter the war directly. However, according to American politicians, Tehran ignored his warnings; pro-Iranian groups attacked American troops dozens of times in Iraq and Syria, demonstrating disdain for US threats.

The apparent weakening of Iran’s deterrence is believed in the US intelligence community to influence Tehran’s decisions about whether to cross the nuclear threshold. The Iranian military may conclude that Israel is distracted and unwilling or unable to launch military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites for fear of sparking a wider war in the Middle East. In any case, the Biden administration’s failure to contain small-scale military strikes by Tehran proxies raises doubts about Biden’s willingness to order military strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities if Tehran presses ahead with a nuclear bomb.

According to the latest data provided by the IAEA, Iran has reserves of enough enriched uranium to produce weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear device in just 12 days. It also notes that the Iranians could produce enough material for 10 nuclear devices in just four months, and Tehran would likely need only a few months to build a nuclear weapon once it had weapons-grade uranium. It is difficult to judge to what extent such assessments and forecasts correspond to reality; no significant evidence has been presented to the Security Council by the IAEA.

​ Recall that Iran initially showed restraint in its nuclear research for more than two years after President Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in May 2018. Tehran may have been wary of the US because of the Trump administration’s willingness to use military force in addition to sweeping economic and financial sanctions. Since November 2020, however, Iran has taken major steps toward expanding its nuclear program, pushing for sanctions relief from the Biden administration as part of its efforts to revive the JCPOA. Tehran enriched uranium to 20%, then to an unprecedented 60%, and then experimented with enriching it to almost 90% (weapon-grade). The Islamic Republic has also produced uranium metal (the material used in nuclear weapons cores), restarted its underground enrichment plant at Fordo and deployed more than 6,500 rapid production centrifuges.

Iran’s transition to nuclear weapons may be facilitated by Iranian restrictions on international control. Since late 2020, Tehran has steadily reduced IAEA monitoring of its nuclear activities. In February 2021, Tehran stopped complying with the IAEA’s enhanced inspection agreement, the so-called Additional Protocol, and suspended implementation of JCPOA-related monitoring measures such as CCTV cameras and personal surveillance at key sites, expelling them from the country in September 2023. a third of IAEA inspectors. Today there are reports that Iran stores more than 80% of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium at the Esfahan fuel plant in small, easily moved containers.

It is unclear whether the IAEA is adequately monitoring these stocks. Washington assumes that the IAEA cannot monitor Iran’s production and stockpile of rapid production centrifuges or check whether the centrifuges were diverted to a secret enrichment facility. Two of Iran’s three enrichment plants (the main Natanz plant and the Fordo fuel enrichment plant) are somewhat protected from military attacks. Fordo is located deepest underground, and is better suited for the rapid production of nuclear weapons.

Tehran may decide to cross the nuclear threshold, believing it could force the Biden administration to contain Israel, further limit American activities in the region and provide cover for its regional goals. Biden’s ineffective deterrence could give Iran the impression that the nuclear-armed Islamic Republic could force Washington to withhold or limit aid to Tel Aviv and other regional US allies.

As can be seen, the absence of any diplomatic movement on the part of the United States towards reviving the JCPOA poses a real threat to the security of the Middle East. The UN rightly believes that in order to extend the JCPOA, it is extremely important to reverse the steps taken by the Trump administration when withdrawing from the nuclear agreement.